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The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 1992 with the 
mission of bringing together at the Institute for a given academic year a group of 
experts, under the supervision of annual scientific director(s), for researching a 
specific topic primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary nature. 
 
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1999-2000 European 
Forum programme on “Between Europe and the Nation State: the Reshaping of 
Interests, Identities and Political Representation” directed by Professors Stefano 
Bartolini (EUI, SPS Department), Thomas Risse (EUI, RSC/SPS Joint Chair) 
and Bo Stråth (EUI, RSC/HEC Joint Chair). 
 
The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, studying the 
extent to which  Europeanisation shapes the adaptation patterns, power 
redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The categories of 
‘interest’ and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a particular 
emphasis is given to the formation of new social identities, the redefinition of 





The following discusses theoretical issues that have emerged within regional 
(sub-national) and global economic studies. I examine the assertion that regional 
governments within a global economy need to take a more active role in regional 
economic development. Under this theoretical contention I examine the extent to 
which European Union (EU) regulations affect regional governments’ capacity to 
legislate, implement and regulate regional economic development policy. The 
Autonomous Communities (ACs) of Galicia and Valencia are studied to see 
whether EU agricultural regulations have constrained regional governments’ 
policy-making ability within sectors that are the ACs competency and important 
to the regional economy.  
 
The comparative analysis suggests that EU regulatory policy can constrain 
regional governments’ policy-making ability depending on: 1) the ability of the 
region to influence the national EU agenda; and 2) the extent to which a region’s 
industries compete with other European countries. Thus, EU regulatory policy 
has a  varying effect upon regional governments’ policy-making ability, even 
within the same national border. 
 Does the European Union (EU) affect the ability of regional governments to 
create and implement regional economic development policies? Regional 
economic disequalibrium has plagued Europe throughout history and is 
particularly problematic for the achievement of successful economic integration 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 1978; Leonardi and Nanetti, 1990). Although regional 
economic disparities present a challenge to economic integration, some scholars 
suggest that European integration itself may actually intensify regional economic 
differences (Vanhove and Klaassen, 1987; Bachtler and Turok, 1997). To resolve 
regional economic disparities the EU established a  European regional 
development policy (ERDP) to accompany the accession of Ireland, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom. ERDP was later modified with the accession of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece in 1986 and the negotiations of the Single European Act 
(SEA) of 1987. The SEA encouraged a change in region-state relations and 
attempted to give regional and local governments more economic decision-
making abilities to improve regional economies (Leonardi and Nanetti, 1990:2; 
Balme, 1997). It was believed that ameliorating regional economic disparities 
would help to ensure the achievement of an integrated market (Marks 1993; 
Keating 1997).  
 
  In addition to regional development policy the EU has also become 
increasingly involved in regulatory policy. Regulations created at the European 
level are formulated to ensure openness of trade among member states, to 
promote competition or to protect certain industries (e.g. agricultural policy). The 
goal of structural policies such as ERDP and regulatory policies are distinct. 
Structural policies attempt to rectify socio-economic and physical conditions 
within and between territories to improve economic conditions. On the other 
hand, regulatory policies’ goal is to promote free trade and competition or to 
implement mechanisms to compensate for problems the market cannot regulate 
itself. 
 
  Although the goals of ERDP, a structural policy differ significantly from 
regulatory policy goals, it seems that regulatory policies can affect structural 
conditions. In particular, I suggest that  EU regulatory policy has re-enforced 
regional economic differences. EU regulatory policy has constrained the ability of 
some regional governments to create and implement development policies most 
appropriate for their respective region.  
 
Changes in international economics have made it increasingly important for 
regional governments to take an active role in regional economic development 
policy-making (Keating, 1998; Storper, 1997; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; 
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1990). The extent to which EU regulatory policy constrains 
regional government economic development policy-making, however, varies  
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across regions within the same national borders. Whether a region’s industries 
compete with other European countries and the ability of a region to influence the 
national EU agenda explains this variation.  
 
With increased European integration, the EU has become involved in many 
different policy areas, including regional development and regulatory policy. To 
analyze whether EU regulatory policy affects the ability of regional governments 
to create and implement regional economic development policy it is useful to 
incorporate a model that takes into account the complexity of the relations among 
different levels of government in the EU. The conceptual framework that best 
addresses this issue is the multi-level governance model (Marks, 1993; Marks, et 
al. 1996). This model asserts that with European integration there has been a re-
allocation among the supra-national, national and sub-national levels of 
government. In the examination of ERDP some scholars imply that under the 
conceptual framework of multi-level governance the policy-making capacity of 
regional governments have been improved (Conzelmann, 1995). If we examine 
other policy sectors does the improvement of regional government policy-making 
capacities still hold true? 
   
Important economic and regulatory policy-making has been re-allocated to 
the European level. Thus, there has been a significant change in the role of 
national governments, which once had sole competence in these policy sectors. 
As member states re-allocate policy responsibilities to the EU, how has it 
affected the policy-making capacity of regional governments? Although the multi-
level governance model implies that the EU can empower regional governments’ 
policy-making capacity, does this actually occur in practice? 
 
  Even though we have seen a general trend toward the empowerment of 
regional governments throughout Europe (Kohler-Koch, 1995; Sharpe, 1993), I 
suggest that European regulatory  policy has affected the regional development 
policy-making ability of regional governments. Although regulatory policies tend 
to be defined by sector, they may also have a territorial impact. Since certain 
regions may not have diversified economies, EU regulations can have a 
significant effect on a region’s economy if the regulations correspond to the 
major industries of a region. As a result, those regions which EU regulatory 
policy affects will also find their ability to implement and legislate regional 
economic development policy constrained. On the other hand, those regions that 
EU regulatory policy does not affect will not find their regional governments’ 
economic development policy-making ability constrained and may even find it 
enhanced. Thus, the effect EU regulatory policy will have upon the ability of 
regional governments to create and implement economic development policy 
varies across regions even within the same national borders.  
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REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS’ POLICY-MAKING AND EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION 
 
Regional governments’ policy-making ability refers to the capacity of regional 
governments to legislate, implement and regulate policies, as they deem 
appropriate. The empowerment of regions and particularly improvement of 
regional governments’ policy-making ability is essential for both strengthening the 
quality of democracy and improving regional economic development. 
Democratization literature suggests that the empowerment of regional 
governments helps to bring government closer to the people, thus allowing for a 
more responsive and participatory system (Schmidt, 1990). This is particularly 
true in the context of former dictatorships such as in Germany, Italy and Spain 
(Sharpe, 1993). In countries with a highly centralized authoritarian past, 
decentralization of power has become intrinsically linked to democratization.  
 
The creation of regional governments alone, however, does not necessarily 
ensure the democratizing effects of decentralizing government responsibilities. 
Regional governments need to have real  legislative and executive powers to 
ensure the democratizing effects of increased regional government 
responsiveness. If regional governments are to be responsive and to allow for 
strong citizen participation they need to have the ability to create and implement 
policies most suitable to the condition of the region and to reflect the needs and 
wants of citizens. If regional governments do not have policy-making ability then 
the democratizing effects related to bringing government closer to people are 
negated.  
 
As mentioned previously, literature regarding the EU suggests that the EU 
has promoted regional governments’ policy-making discretion (Marks 1993; 
Marks, et. al. 1996). Thus, we might assume that the EU has had the capacity to 
improve the democratic quality of member states. In fact, in the case of Spain, 
advocates of European integration forcefully and persuasively have argued that 
membership into the EU would foster economic development, and facilitate a 
deepening of democratic consolidation (Closa, 1995; Maravall and Santamaría, 
1986). Other literature, however, asserts that the EU’s effect upon increasing 
regional governments’ policy-making ability may not be as strong as previous 
studies suggest (Colino, 1996). The following discussion supports the latter 
perspective and suggests that EU regulatory policy has not promoted regional 
governments’ policy-making ability in the area of regional economic development 
in some regions. 
 
In addition to the democratizing effects of regional government policy-
making abilities, scholars suggest that it is also essential to achieving the goals of  
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regional economic development (Bachtler, 1997; Keating 1998; Leonardi and 
Nanetti, 1990). First, each region has its own economic structure, which may 
vary from the overall economy of an entire country (Vanhove and Klaassen, 
1987). Intuitively, since a regional government is in closer proximity to the 
particular socio-economic situation of a region it seems that regional government 
officials will be better informed and attuned to the economic conditions and 
needs of their region. Thus, the proximity of regional government to its citizens 
and economic structure provides regional governments with information and 




In addition, John Bachtler (1997) points out that an important aspect of the 
new regional development model 
 
“is the mobilization of regional resources around new regional innovation networks 
that involve a high degree of vertical and horizontal collaboration among firms and 
the close involvement of a wide range of public and private organizations specializing 
in business information, consultancy services and technology transfer” (p. 87). 
 
In this way, proximity can provide regional governments with the tools necessary 
to create the kinds of policies most appropriate to the specific socio-economic 
conditions of a region and to act as a conductor of networks between the public 
and private sector to promote innovation networks.
2 
 
Second, globalization, of which the EU is one aspect, has created 
circumstances that make it increasingly important for regional governments to 
take an active role in regional economic development policy. Globalization, as it 
is being used here, refers to trade liberalization policies, “the concentration of 
capital in multinationals, the free movement of capital and investment flows and 
the increased choice of location for investors” (Keating, 1998: 139). Prior to 
these changes in the international economy and the problems associated with the 
1970’s oil crisis, regions were able successfully to follow the economic model 
based upon the Ricardian theory. Basically, the Ricardian theory states that 
“regions will specialize in the products and services to which they are best suited 
by the principle of comparative advantage” (Vanhove and Klaassen, 1987: 15). 
This theory, however, does not take into account the mobility of factors. The 
phenomenon of globalization, however, promotes the mobility of factors. Thus, 
international trade is no longer based on comparative advantage, but rather 
absolute or competitive advantage (Keating, 1998; Vanhove and Klaassen, 1987 
and Armstrong and Taylor, 1978).  
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Under comparative advantage the goal is to be the most productive region 
in a particular sector. In a global economy, however, regions need to have more 
dynamic economies to entice and capture foreign capital. Therefore, we need to 
think of regions as “productive systems, marked by untraded interdependencies 
and in competition with other regions…Regions are pitted in competition for 
niches in world markets, for investment and technological advantage” (Keating, 
1998:140). Thus, under the condition of globalization regional governments need 
to take a more active role to win foreign capital. 
 
Third, in conjunction with globalization, international trade rules and 
restrictions on national government subsidies to underdeveloped industries has 
made it imperative for regional governments to solve their own economic 
problems. Due to these restrictions, national governments can no longer act as a 
buffer against the direct effects of the global economy upon regional economies 
(Keating, 1998). In addition, as international competition increases and national 
governments need to be more fiscally responsible, central governments have 
begun to change their regional development strategies.  
 
In the context of Europe, members of the Euro have had to follow a strict 
policy of maintaining a very low deficit and to keep inflation at a low level. Thus, 
governments must be more careful with their budgetary expenditure and to use 
money most efficiently and effectively. Under these budgetary constraints and the 
strategies of competitive advantage, national governments have tended to allocate 
funds to their most competitive sectors (usually located in their most competitive 
regions) (Keating, 1998). In this way, national governments can get the most 
return using less money. The above scenario demonstrates how national 
governments are playing less of a mediating role between regional and 
international economies. Therefore, the impact of the international economy is 
more direct upon regions (particularly economically weak regions). Regions 
themselves need to take a more active role in their own development  to 
compensate for the decrease in national regional development intervention. 
 
Fourth, pressures from “below” among business leaders and individuals 
concerned with socio-economic conditions have sought out regional 
governments to take a leading role in regional economic development. Leonardi 
and Nanetti’s (1990) study of the economically successful region of Emilia-
Romagna suggests that, in general, with economic integration business leaders 
have become more aware of the importance of regional attributes to determining 
whether localities could adapt to the challenges of the Maastricht treaty (Leonardi 
and Nanetti, 1990:2). Both social and economic interests increasingly demanded 
that “regional governments prepare themselves and the local community for both 
the opportunities and difficulties inherent in the creation of a common market”  
RSC 2000/49 © 2000 Carolyn Marie Dudek  8
(Leonardi and Nanetti, 1990:2). As business leaders seek out regional 
governments to take an active role in the economy, regional public officials will 
need to act in order to f ulfill the demands of its constituency and to retain 
legitimacy.  
Fifth, scholars suggest that a strong regional government is essential to 
economic development, especially in economically weak regions. For example, 
Cooke and Morgan (1998) assert that for regions with weak economies there is 
greater need for a strong and leading role of regional state apparati to “cover the 
many enterprise support functions executed by private or quasi-private, 
associational interests in accomplished economies” (p.194). Conversely, they 
assert that in more economically developed regions there is less need for such 
regional government intervention since private associations can provide some of 
the services regional governments provide (i.e. research and development, survey 
distribution to better understand regional concerns). If EU regulatory policies 
constrain regional economic development policy-making of economically weaker 
regions then, according to Cooke and Morgan (1998), this would be particularly 
problematic since they assert that economically weak regions necessitate strong 
regional governments.  
 
It is clear that regional government policy-making ability is essential for the 
qualitative improvement of democracy and more central to this discussion, 
regional economic development. Does this mean that a qualitatively better 
democratic system will be more economically efficient and more spatially 
cohesive? The link between democracy and economic development has been 
difficult to prove. Guillermo O’Donnell’s (1988) writing o n bureaucratic 
authoritarianism demonstrates that under a non-democratic regime an economy 
can flourish (although temporarily, as the experiences of Chile and Argentina in 
the late 70’s and early 80’s suggest). It seems that in the European context, the 
improved quality of representation, associated with the empowerment of regions, 
has helped to ensure democratic stability. For example, part of the empowerment 
of the Autonomous Communities (ACs) in Spain included delegating cultural 
policy to the regional l evel. The re-allocation of cultural policy to the ACs has 
allowed ACs with regional languages and identities to preserve their own regional 
identity, thus diffusing animosities toward the Spanish state which in the past was 
perceived as imposing its culture, that of Castille. 
Economic efficiency and spatial cohesion are also important elements that 
can give stability to a democratic regime. It has been demonstrated that economic 
disequalibria can cause civil unrest and the rise of non-democratic systems 
(Malloy and Seligson, 1987). It is unclear, however, whether democracy brings 
about economic efficiency and spatial cohesiveness or if the casual path is the 
other way around. It seems that there is a feedback mechanism in which 
democracy can bring about economic efficiency and spatial cohesion and these  
RSC 2000/49 © 2000 Carolyn Marie Dudek  9
economic conditions can bolster democracy. Thus, I would suggest that a more 
participatory and representative democratic system, which can be achieved 
through the empowerment of regional governments, is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to ensure economic efficiency and spatial cohesiveness. For 
example, the will of political actors and the condition of the international 
economy are circumstances that can thwart these economic objectives (Piattoni 
and Smyrl, 1998 and Vanhove and Klaassen, 1987). 
 
THE IMPACT OF EU REGULATORY POLICY UPON REGIONAL 
GOVERNEMNT’S REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY-MAKING 
ABILITY 
 
To study regional governments’ ability to create and implement economic 
development policies within an integrated Europe it is essential to examine what 
impact—if any—the EU may have. In the context of the EU, it is important to 
recognize the extent to which certain policy areas associated with economic 
development have been re-allocated from the national to supra-national level. One 
important competency allocated to the European level that directly affects 
national and regional economies is agricultural regulatory policy. Has the re-
distribution of this important competency affected the ability of regional 
governments to create and implement regional economic development policy? 
 
Regulatory policy differs from other kinds of policies since the costs and 
benefits are specific to certain sectors or industries. Theodore Lowi distinguishes 
regulatory policy from distributive or re-distributive policy since its impact is 
specific. He asserts that the “impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of 
directly raising costs and or reducing or expanding the alternatives of private 
individuals” (Lowi, 1964:690). Thus, regulatory policy involves a “direct choice 
as to who will be indulged and who will be deprived” (Lowi, 1964:690-1). 
 
Giandomenico Majone (1996) asserts that in the context of European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the costs of regulation are concentrated (by 
country) whereas the benefits tend to be diffuse. The following discussion, 
however, suggests that CAP regulations tend to have both concentrated costs 
and benefits not only according to sector, but also upon certain territorial units 
within member states. Thus, regulations conventionally conceived as having 
sectoral effects also have a territorial impact. I suggest that EU regulations can, in 
some cases, re-enforce regionally oriented economic disparities. 
   
To understand better if the impact of regulatory policy formulated at the 
European level differs from regulatory policies created at the national level we 
need to examine the dynamics of the actual formulation of EU regulatory policies.  
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The process of creating regulatory policy, in part, shapes the subsequent type of 
policies chosen. In particular, the creation of EU regulation policy differs from 
the once nationally created policy in the way constituencies are represented, 
officials are held accountable and the aim of these policies. I suggest that the lack 
of direct political accountability of EU officials and the attempt to create policies 
more universal in scope to address the concerns of fifteen member states with 
diverse economies explains why EU regulatory policies can have not only a 
sectoral impact, but a territorial one as well. 
 
In the context of the EU the political dynamics of the players involved in 
regulatory policy-making is quite different than at the national level. The European 
Commission, composed of appointed officials, and the Council of Ministers, 
composed of indirectly elected officials, are the two institutions most directly 
involved in the creation of regulatory policy. European Commissioners are 
responsible for making policies in the interest of Europe, whereas the Council of 
Ministers represents both general European interests and the interests of their 
own member states. 
   
Within a strictly national context, some scholars suggest that public 
officials who create regulatory policy must take into account their specific 
constituencies and voter support to ensure future electoral success and 
legitimacy (Peltzman, 1976). At the European level, however, representation takes 
on a different form. One of the criticisms of the EU is its democratic deficit. 
European citizens often do not have the ability to hold European officials 
accountable. For instance, European Commissioners are appointed officials who 
do not have a directly voting constituency to please. Thus, they are not beholden 
to any specific group and even if a Commissioner’s member state does not 
approve of a certain policy they can always use the excuse that a certain policy 
was impossible due to the pressures of other members. Similarly, Ministers can 
do the same and legitimize their support for policies that may adversely affect 
their country by simply blaming it upon the pressures of the other members. The 
above example demonstrates that policy formulation at the European level does 
not have the type of accountability mechanisms as policy formulation at the 
national level. For this reason Giandomenico Majone (1996) asserts that the 
transference of competencies to the European level challenges the democratic 
legitimacy and public accountability of EU policies.  
   
In addition to not having the same kinds of constituency concerns national 
policy makers once had, the policies themselves have a different target. Policies 
that emerge from the EU are not only an aggregation of interests within a country, 
but also a further aggregation among fifteen member states. Due to this highly 
aggregated “watered down” version of interests the goals of regulatory policy at  
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the EU level differ significantly from those previously decided within a strictly 
national context under very different conditions. 
   
At the EU level, representatives of member states attempt to shape 
European policy according to their national EU agenda. As member states 
interact and bargain with one another at the EU level, national EU agendas 
become softened and there is an attempt to reach a decision that is acceptable to 
all fifteen members. Thus, I suggest that EU regulatory policies are made with the 
intention of having a more universal impact to accommodate the interests of all 
member states. It seems, however, that as the EU attempts to make policies more 
universal in their impact they unintentionally favor certain regions.  
 
First, the configuration of regional attributes varies from region to region 
and plays an important role in determining the success of a region’s economic 
capabilities (Storper, 1997). If EU regulatory policy attempts to be universal in its 
impact it will actually not be because, although member states may have 
diversified economies regions often tend to be less diversified and to have a 
concentration of certain industries. Thus, EU regulatory policies may affect some 
regions more than others. Regions with more diversified economies will be better 
able to protect themselves from the adverse effects of EU regulatory policy. 
Economic sectors such as agriculture, shipbuilding, steel and other industries, 
however, tend to be located in certain areas. In agriculture certain types of crops 
or livestock accumulate in specific regions due to climate, soil conditions, etc. 
Shipbuilding tends to occur in regions where there is a prevalent supply of 
lumber and waterways (i.e. Mecklenburg and Galicia). These industries are very 
specialized and can be a mainstay for a region, especially when considering the 
associated auxiliary industries. Thus, when those specific sectors are affected the 
entire regional economy is affected. 
 
Second, national EU agendas tend to favor certain sectors that exist within 
particular regions. Territorial organization within states, differential political 
strength of regions to influence the national agenda and the extent to which 
certain sectors and regional economies compete with other member states 
determines the extent to which certain regional interests become transferred into 
the national EU agenda. As discussed earlier, the dynamics associated with the 
ideals of competitive advantage suggest that national governments will be more 
likely to invest and support their most competitive industries, which usually exist 
within the more economically advanced regions. Territorial economic interests 
are transformed through national representation into the EU’s policy-making 
bodies. As a result, EU regulatory policy does not simply affect certain 
economic sectors, but also regional economies and regional governments’ 
policy-making ability to improve their regional economic development.  
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Sharpe (1993) suggests that the internal market intensifies the economic 
marginality of countries within the economic periphery in Europe and also 
enhances the peripheral nature of peripheral regions in these countries. In 
addition, he suggests that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU has 
favored larger arable and less labor intensive farms.
3 With the EU, countries 
cannot merely establish trade barriers to protect their own industries. Previously 
domestic oriented industries become forced to compete with industries in other 
European countries. In addition, the EU can legislate economic policy that affects 
certain economic sectors. Production, particularly agricultural production, tends 
to have a territorial dynamic. Regions often tend to have a concentration of a few 
major crops or products and are not as economically diversified as a country.
4 
Therefore, EU regulations on certain economic sectors will disproportionately 




In what way has EU regulatory policy affected regional governments’ ability to 
create, implement and regulate their own regional economic development policy? 
If so, what does this mean for regional economic development? To answer these 
questions let us examine two Spanish regions. Spain is a useful case since it is a 
quasi-federal system and has allocated the competency of regional economic 
development to the regional or Autonomous Community (AC) level. I have 
chosen the ACs of Galicia and Valencia, which are most different regions 
according to economic structures, which will allow us to see whether European 
regulatory policy affects all regional economic conditions in the same way. These 
are useful comparative cases since they hold constant the level of constitutionally 
established autonomy.
5 In addition, both of these AC’s are categorized as 
Objective 1 regions
6 and receive EU funds for infrastructure and the protection 
and improvement of the agricultural sector. Valencia, however, has a significantly 
stronger economy than that of Galicia. These regions represent the diversity of 
Spain since one region is representative of the Mediterranean climate and 
economy (Valencia) and the other of the Continental climate and economy 
(Galicia), however, using these regions avoids the problematic nature of unique 
cases such as Catalonia that limit comparative application in other settings.  
 
A decentralized system in Spain is imperative to the preservation of peace. 
Animosity between those in favor of a centralized system and those that wanted 
more responsibility for regional governments has been a reoccurring theme that 
has acted itself out in violent ways i.e. the Spanish Civil War. Spain is composed 
of a mosaic of different cultures, languages, climates and levels of economic 
development. This diversity has had an effect upon the evolution of the  
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Autonomous Communities (ACs) of Spain (Pérez-Díaz, 1990). I propose that 
this diversity has also led to a variation in how the EU affects each Spanish AC.  
 
Economic disequalibrium among Spanish regions historically has been a 
source of tension between central and regional governments and among regional 
governments. Economic disparity, in part, is due to Spain’s geography. Some 
AC’s have benefited from their location and have been able to have prosperous, 
internationally oriented trade, i.e. Valencia. By contrast, other AC’s have been 
geographically inhibited from enjoying such benefits and have been forced to 
focus on domestic markets, i.e. Galicia. In addition, Spain consists of 
continental, mediterranean and tropical  climates. This geographic condition 
facilitates a diverse economy, particularly in the agricultural sector. This means 
that the central government of Spain has the difficult task to create and to 
implement a single agrarian policy, and to present and defend it at the European 
level.  
 
To understand better how the EU might affect regional economies and 
regional governments’ economic development policy-making ability in Galicia 
and Valencia, let us examine the agricultural sectors in these regions vital to their 
economic success. Agriculture is useful to examine since the formulation of 
regional development policy, including agriculture and fishing policies are 
important competencies allocated to the AC’s and established in the statutes of 
each AC.
7 Considering the importance of agricultural and fishing sectors in Spain 
and the historic tensions concerning the lack of a decentralized regional 
development policy under Franco it is obvious that these are very important 
competencies given to the regions. Therefore, their preservation is central to the 
success of a decentralized system in Spain.  
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SPAIN’S ACCESSION OF THE EU AND ITS IMPACT 
UPON AGRICULTURE 
 
Spain’s accession into the European Community was somewhat problematic 
because Spain’s unique conditions introduced a whole new set of challenges to 
further integration. Spain’s economy was predominantly agricultural and closed 
to international trade. Its agricultural sector was still using older technologies. The 
industrial sector was hurt by the oil crisis, employment was a problem since 
women were just beginning to be incorporated into the work place and those 
moving from rural areas to Madrid to find work encountered difficulties since 
they did not have proper skills (interview, Ministry of Economics, 1997). One of 
the biggest difficulties was that Spain’s economy had been quite insular and was 
closed to international trade. Spain was still an industrializing country. Workers 
salaries were lower than the rest of Europe, which gave Spain a competitive 
advantage in industry. 
 
Spain’s agricultural sector was especially problematic. Unlike other 
countries in the EU, Spain has a continental, mediterranean and tropical 
agricultural sector. Other European countries, especially France, were quite 
vigilant with Spain’s a ccession because it meant new competition for their 
agricultural products. Farmers from the Southeast of France were particularly 
watchful of Spanish accession and used political pressure to protect their 
agricultural interests in Europe.  
 
The region of Galicia historically has had an agriculturally based economy. 
In 1989, the region produced 28% of Spain’s milk production, 17% of Spain’s 
total beef and 30% of Spain’s wood (Xunta de Galicia, 1989: 19). Modernization 
of the agricultural sector, however, is  limited due to the practice of 
minifundismo, the use of small plots of land (Xunta de Galicia, 1989: 19-20). 
Disperse appropriation of land places limitations upon production and efficiency 
of production. In addition, lack of infrastructure in Galicia detracts from the 
ability to transport goods. Even though Galicia has a relatively large milk-
producing sector, 30% of its product is processed outside of Galicia (Xunta de 
Galicia, 1989: 20). Although Galician agriculture is technologically 
underdeveloped, as demonstrated by the continued use of horses for plowing 
and machetes for cutting crops, agriculture still remains an important economic 
sector for the region.   
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Source:  Xunta de Galicia. PDR 1989-1993. Consellería de Economía e Facenda, 1989. 
Xunta de Galicia PDR 1994-1999. Consellería de Economía e Facenda, 1996. 

























Figure 1: Percentage that Agriculture and Fishing 
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MILK QUOTAS: THE CURSE OF ACCESSION  
 
As part of Spain’s accession agreement and in cooperation with CAP, 
restrictions were placed on milk, wine and sugar to stabilize EU subsidies in these 
sectors. For some sectors, however, these restrictions were insufficient for the 
development of normal agriculture in Spain (Ministry of Agriculture, interview, 
1997). One of the sectors often suggested as one of Spain’s most hurt is the 
dairy sector. The milk quota placed on Spain is below the level of Spanish 
consumption. Therefore, Spain has become dependent upon imported milk. The 
quota amount was created from producers reported amount of milk production. 
Some public officials suggest that farmers under reported their production, which 
caused the creation of an inaccurate quota (Member of Galician Parliament, 
interview, 1996). Whether this is true or not the quota has been insufficient to 
meet the demands of the consumer and the capability of producers.  
 
Spanish dairy farmers are not permitted to produce above the set quota 
and when they do they must pay a high penalty. Improved technology also makes 
this situation more problematic because with improved animal health and genetics 
a farmer may have the same amount of cows, but is now able to produce more 
milk. The farmer, however, is not allowed to produce more. The establishment of 
milk quotas is one of the historic repercussions of Spain’s entrance into the EU 
(Ministry of Agriculture, interview, 1997).  
 
Milk quotas in the EC were first created in 1984.
8 The quota was created in 
response to a crisis of milk surplus in northern Europe. To remedy the problem 
of over-production, demonstrated by mounds of butter and powdered milk, the 
EC established quotas to avoid such surplus and to make European milk more 
competitive. Spain entered the EU just following this crisis, making it necessary 
to enforce quotas upon Spanish milk production. The historical context suggests 
that perhaps this crisis of over-production influenced the placement of a rather 
high quota on Spain to provide a new market for European milk products and to 
control competition that might come from Spain. In addition, the fear of 
repeating the crisis may also have contributed to the establishment of a stringent 
quota.  
 
If we examine Spain’s import and production of milk it is clear that 
imports have increased at a faster rate than production. Table 1 below 
demonstrates that Spain’s milk production has remained constant since its 
membership in the EU. Meanwhile, imports more than tripled since the year prior 
to Spain’s entry into the EU, 1985. H ave imports increased because Spain or 
more specifically, Galicia, is incapable of producing more milk?  
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In actuality the Galicians are capable of increasing their milk production. 
Table 2 below demonstrates that Spain has produced above its allotted quota 
and has been forced to pay high penalties for doing so. Galicia has also paid a 
high price for over-production. For example, (see figure below) in the 1995-96 
fiscal year, Spain was forced to pay a 7,400 million pesetas (La Voz de Galicia, 
December 6, 1996) in penalties for an over production of 126,000 tons of milk 
(La Voz de Galicia, December 4, 1996). Galicia alone contributed approximately 
2,500 million pesetas or 29.6% to the penalty (La Voz de Galicia, December 6, 
1996). Considering that Galicia is  one of the poorest regions in Spain these 
penalties are of concern. 
 
When the EU first announced the fine, Spain’s agricultural minister 
responded to public outcry and stated that she had already presented a petition 
to the EU to reduce the fine. The European Commission in early December 1996 
responded and asserted that they had received no such request ( La Voz de 
Galicia, December 5, 1996). Eventually, the Agricultural Minister presented a 
petition to the EU, but her request was denied. A less than immediate reaction on 
the part of the Spanish government suggests that perhaps the issue of milk 
production was not as important as protecting other industries that are less 




Table 1: Import and Production of Spanish Dairy 
 
Year  Total Milk Product Imports (in tonnage) into 
Spain 
1985 (prior to EC adhesion)  180,935 
1986  343,367 
1994  690,992 
 
Year  Total Spanish Milk Production (1,000 liters) 
1986  6,583,008 
1994  6,519,966 
 
Source: Anuario de Estadisticas Agraria, Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentacion, 1985, 
1986, 1994.  
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Table 2: Production of Milk in Spain and EU Penalty for Quota Over-Production 
 
Year  Amount Exceeding Quota (tons)  Penalty (millions of pesetas) 
1988-89  +539  23,420 
1989-90  +1,330  57,683 
1990-91  +1,506  71,871 
1991-92  +665  31,601 
1992-93  +330  15,360 
1993-94  +29,157  1,680 
1994-5  -42,800  0 
1995-96  +126,000  7,400 
 
Source: “La Supertasa láctea equivale a la producción de 14,000 vacas”  La Voz de Galicia, 
November 19, 1996, pg.65-original source- Spanish Ministry of Agriculture 
 
 
To better evaluate the quota system lets compare Spain with Italy. Both countries 
have a similar agricultural structure, i.e. northern regions produce milk products 
and southern regions Mediterranean products. Italy, however, is one of the 
founding members of the EU. As mentioned earlier, Spanish officials suggest that 
Spain was given a lower quota than other member states due to their late entry 
and economic situation of common agricultural policy in Europe. The milk 
reference quantities of Italy and Spain are as follows: 
 
Table 3: Milk Reference Quantities for Italy and Spain: 1996-97 Quota 
 
 
Country  Total Reference Quantity (million 
tons) 
%of total 
Italy  9,930  8.5% 
Spain  5,567  4.7% 
 
Source: Commission of the European Union. DG XI D1. “Situation and Outlook: Dairy Sector.” 
April, 1997. 
  
Table 3 above demonstrates that the Italian milk quota is 56% more than the 
Spanish quota. The larger quota size may be merely due to the fact that Italy has 
a larger milk producing sector and greater consumption to compensate for the 
higher supply. Upon closer examination, this does not seem to be the case. If we 
compare the total number of dairy cows and the amount of land holdings 
devoted to this sector, the numbers do not support the need for Italy to have a 
larger quota. 
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Table 4: Survey on the Structure of Agricultural Holdings, 1993—Animal Breeding 
 
Total holdings (x 1000) Dairy Cows 
Spain  144 
Italy  143.1 
 




Table 5: Survey on the Structure of Agricultural Holdings Broken Down by Type of 
Farming, 1993—Cattle--Dairy 
 
Total holdings x 1,000 (acres) 
Spain  83.4 
Italy  66.0 
 
Source: Office of Statistics of the European Union. Basic Statisitics of the European Union, 1999: 
292-93 
 
Table 6: Consumption of Fresh Milk Products (Except Cream) 
 
Kg per Head per Year 
Europe 15  111.2 
Spain  125.8 
Italy  62.1 
 




Tables 4, 5 and 6 demonstrate that Spain has more land holdings for dairy 
production, equal holdings for dairy cattle breading and higher levels of milk 
consumption than Italy. Why then does Italy have a larger quota than Spain? One 
way to answer this question is to suggest that agricultural regulatory policy tends 
to be a much more politicized sector. This is attributed to the very nature of 
agricultural policy with its need for subsidies and the strong agriculture lobbies of 
member states. This explanation, however, does not provide a complete answer. 
As suggested earlier, since Italy was an older member of the European 
Community it was able to have a stronger bargaining position regarding Spanish 
accession. Spain, as a new member of the “club” needed to abide by the 
conditions of the accession treaty set forth by the current members. There was 
such a strong desire on the part of the Spanish elite and general population to join  
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the European Community that Spain was willing to do so, even to their own 
detriment, since the benefits outweighed the costs. 
TERRITORIAL IMPACT OF EU MILK REGULATIONS 
 
The issue of milk quotas demonstrates that EU regulations have not only a 
sectoral effect, but also a regional one. Milk production in Spain is concentrated 
in the Cantabrias, the northern region. Thus, only some ACs are affected. Milk 
quota regulations restrict the ability of certain ACs, like Galicia, to legislate and 
implement policy. Although 10,000 dairy farmers protested against the Xunta 
(government of the AC of Galicia) in response to EU policy there is very little the 
Xunta can do to remedy the situation. EU stipulations restrict the policy-making 
agenda of regional governments and as a result some regional governments like 
Galicia, are finding their policy-making abilities constrained. The issue of EU 
dairy regulations suggests that EU regulations have not only a sectoral impact, 
but also a territorial one since certain agricultural sectors are located only in 
specific regions. These regulations especially affect a region like Galicia since 
29% of its population is employed in agriculture; fishing and milk production 
being two of the main agricultural products of the region (European Commission, 
1996). 
 
EU INDUCED FISHING RESTRICTIONS: A DOUBLE WHAMMY 
FOR GALICIA 
 
The fishing industry also received restrictions with the entrance of Spain into the 
European Community. European fishing policy was quite limited at the time of 
Spain’s accession and n ot ready to include the large Spanish fishing fleet 
(interview, Agricultural Ministry, 1997). In addition, international agreements 
necessitated restrictions on the fishing sector. As a result, fishing restrictions 
concerning how many boats, how much they could capture and where they could 
fish were established. The fishing agreements have a regressivity clause that fixes 
the limits on fishing increases each year. The purpose of this is to stabilize the 
European Communities fishing sector. 
 
  Fishing is a significant part of Galicia’s agricultural sector. Galicia 
contributes 50% of Spain’s preserved seafood industry (Xunta de Galicia, 1989: 
22). Regionally 4.5% of the Galician population is employed in fishing which 
constitutes 42.3% of the national employment in this sector (European 
Commission, 1996). An additional 5.1% of Galicia’s population is employed in 
industries and services related to fishing such as commerce, fish conserves and 
boat construction(European Commission, 1996). This makes Galicia strongly 
dependent on the fishing industry with its 1600km of coast and more than 80 
ports (European Commission, 1996).  
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  As important as this sector is for the Galician economy it has many 
problems that limit its capabilities. Galicia is dependent on many international 
fishing agreements. This means that Galicia, in accordance with these 
agreements, progressively has decreased the use of international waters and 
receives less access than before to the resources of third world countries. This 
has caused a marked r eduction in Galicia’s fishing capacity (European 
Commission, 1997). The Xunta of Galicia suggests that some of the other 
limitations to the fishing sector are: relatively little knowledge or availability of 
actual or potential marine resources; the Galician fishing fleet is obsolete; little 
ordering and regulating channels of commercialization and an insufficient level of 
associationalism (Xunta de Galicia, 1989).  
 
The Act of Adhesion, 1986 adversely affected the fishing sector. Initially, 
the Community of ten member states had a relatively flexible fishing policy 
established in Regulation 170/83, which simply consisted of a total number of 
captures permitted and its distribution in the form of a quota. The restrictions 




As mentioned earlier, the restrictions placed on fishing tend to have a 
regional impact since it only affects coastal regions. For example, unemployment 
in merchant fishing in Spain is 21,000, 17,000 of those unemployed are Gallegos 
(La Voz de Galicia, November 16, 1996). That means that three out of every 
four unemployed is a Gallego. In part, this increase in unemployment is linked to 
the impact of EU fishing policies. EU policy is aimed at gradually decreasing the 
number of capture. The Commission’s goal is to decrease Spain’s fleet potential 
from the 1994 amount of 1,764,391 to 1,564,391 and tonnage to be decreased 
from the 1994 rate of 570,504 to 470,504 (European Commission, 1996: 69b). 
EU members are forced to follow these regulations, but Galician fisherman are 
dissatisfied since they must compete with third world countries like Morocco 
who do not have to abide by the same rules.  
 
To improve poor fishing conditions the central and regional governments 
have designated funds to improve the situation of Galician fishing. In addition, 
the EU operative program for 1994-1999 community structural funds has 
allocated money to the fishing sector. In particular, financial instruments for 
fisheries guidance (FIFG), is an EU fund for the adaptation of the structures of 
the fishing sector. FIFG is designed to provide financial assistance that is 
“crucial for the structural adaptation necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
common fisheries policy” (Council Regulation 2080/93).
10 
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What sort of recourse do the ACs and their affected industries have in the 
EU to remedy their situation? One venue is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
In a court case of  Area Cova, S.A., and others verses The Council of the 
European Union in the matter of T-194/95. The Xunta declared that since  
 
“the structure of the economy and the society of the AC of Galicia depends 
essentially upon the sector of fishing and this conforms with the Spanish Constitution 
of 1 978 and its Autonomous Statute, the said Community has as a mission the 
defense of its identity and its interests not only national, but also international, which 
could affect (Galicia)” (Court of 1
st Instance, Area Cova, S.A., and others vs. The 
Council of the European Union). 
 
The Secretary of the Tribunal of First Instance on March 25, 1996 decided 
against the intervention of the Xunta of Galicia. The argument for this decision 
was that: 
 
“the Xunta of Galicia is not affected directly or individually for the Regulation (CE) 
nº1761/95 of the Council, on the 29
th of June, 1995, that modification of the 
Regulation (CE) nº3366/94 that establishes for 1995 determined measurements of 
conservation and the expenditure of fishing resources in the zone of regulations 
defined by the Convention about the future multi-lateral cooperation in the fishing 
zones of the northwestern Atlantic (DO L 171, p.1), in the measurement that sets the 
quota of the black fleet reserved to the community float, nor for the agreement of the 
bilateral fishing agreement celebrated between the European Union and Canada. In 
addition, the demand of intervention only contains political arguments and not 
juridical in relation with the contested acts” (Court of 1
st Instance, Area Cova, S.A., 
and others vs. The Council of the European Union). 
 
This case demonstrates that the EU will not allow Galicia to have direct influence 
at the EU level upon fishing policy. The decision was made regardless of the 
Spanish constitution and Autonomous Statute of Galicia that partially allocates 
competency in the fishing sector to Galicia. This case highlights the restricted 
role ACs have before the EU and that even the ECJ has not upheld the 
subsidiarity principle in certain instances where it is determined to be 
inappropriate.  
 
Another EU imposed restriction is upon boat construction. Funding for 
ship construction has come under criticism from Brussels and international 
sources. Brussels accused Spain of exceeding the 180,000 million peseta 
maximum limit placed upon the total amount of aid that can be distributed to ship 
construction. The Commission has made allegations that the public ship building 
sector had received more aid than the officially known amount ( La Voz de 
Galicia, December 11, 1996). It is believed and will be examined if the shipyards 
received (directly or indirectly) state aid to allow the shipyards to function as  
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usual, even though they are in financial debt. The Commission regulates that 
Spain cannot have more than 180,000 million pesetas in combined state and EU 
aid for ship construction. Great Britain and Denmark were the two countries 
pressuring the Commission to examine these irregularities that benefit Spanish 
shipyards.  
 
In December of 1996, it was reported that the Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), with pressure from the United States, 
has sought to ratify an agreement that will limit the amount of public subventions 
in the ship building sector ( La Voz de Galicia, December 19, 1996). If the 
OECD agreement is not ratified then the Council of Ministers will propose the 
adoption of a policy that is exclusively a community policy. In anticipation of 
ratification, the Commission has decided that aid for boat construction will 
progressively be reduced. For 1997, the Commission proposed that aid for boat 
construction will be at most 9% of large ships and 4.5% for small fishing boats 
and for transformation work.  
 
These EU restrictions on aid to boat construction not only hurts the ship 
building industry which is important to Galicia’s economy, but also perpetuates 
Galicia’s fishing industry problems associated with an obsolete fishing fleet. EU 
restrictions on aid to boat construction have a regional effect since only certain 
coastal regions are boat producers. The national  government is unable to direct 
the amount of funds as they desire to maritime construction, which means that 
the amount of money the state directs to the region of Galicia is limited. EU 
restrictions upon government subventions of an important industry within Galicia 
demonstrates empirically how globalization affects regional and national 
governments; making it necessary for regional governments to take a more active 
role since the national government can no longer provide a buffer between 
international and regional economies.  
 
As boat construction becomes an increasingly problematic sector for 
Galicia, the Xunta must find ways to accommodate for the unemployment and 
other socio-economic repercussions that will result in this sector. Resources are 
limited, this means that most likely the Xunta will either have to reallocate funds 
from other projects to the ship building sector or Galicia will have to suffer the 
consequences of a non-competitive sector. This goes against the purpose of EU 
regional policy, which is to diminish the gap between underdeveloped and 
developed regions. Regulation of aid to boat construction seems to only 
perpetuate Galicia’s regional economic underdevelopment.   
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VALENCIA: MEDITERRANEAN MIRACLE 
 
Quite different from the experience of  Galicia, Valencia has felt no EU 
restrictions upon its agricultural industry. Mediterranean products such as citrus 
and olive oil have little competition with other EU members. Italy and Greece are 
the other two major producers of these products, whereas with milk production 
there are more EU countries that are large milk and fishing producers and are 
countries that are stronger players in the EU. 
 
  The Community of Valencia historically has had an important citrus export 
industry, particularly oranges. Approximately, 70% of Valencia’s orange 
production is designated for export (interview, Ministry of Agriculture, 1997). 
For this reason, in the 60’s and 70’s the Committee of the Management of Citrus 
became active in Europe in response to the creation of European reference 
prices. The Citrus Committee was active in obtaining a discipline of the reference 
price and to ensure that the price would not decrease. Presently, Spain’s citrus 
producers have the strongest lobby in Europe compared to other Spanish 
agricultural sectors. I suggest that their strength is linked to their strong 
institutional history, whereby they were active participants in Europe even during 
the reign of Franco and prior to EU membership. Early participation helped to 
stimulate institutional learning. 
 
  If we examine citrus production as compared to milk production, there has 
been an increase since EU membership, and the level of imports relative to 
exports demonstrates a favorable trade balance for Valencia. 
 
Table 7 demonstrate that Spain’s citrus production has increased between 
1985 and 1994 by 15,821 hectares, a 6% increase. Although imports increased 
dramatically in 1993 and 1994, exports also continued to increase (see figure 3). 
Unlike milk, there is no quota placed upon production, thus citrus farmers can 
produce as much as they please without fear of repercussion. Since there is little 
citrus competition within Europe there are no production restrictions placed upon 
citrus. The over-production of milk, the ecological and market concerns of 
fishing and high European competition of both these products does not occur 
with Mediterranean agricultural goods. When Spain acceded to the EU, there was 
a program to stabilize citrus prices, but there was (and still is) no limitation on 
commerce or production. 
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Table 7: Total Citrus Production (hectares) 
 
  1985-1986  1986-1987  1989  1994 
C. of Valencia  173,166  173,015  176,012  181,255 
Spain  252,354  254,818  261,532  268,175 
 
Source: Anuario de Estadisticas Agraria, Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca  
y Alimentacion, 1985, 1986, 1994. 
 
 





Similarly, there have not been EU induced direct restrictions on olive oil 
production. A quota system does not exist, but rather aid to olive growers is 
dependent upon their level of production. As production increases, EU aid to 
growers decreases. The table 8 demonstrates that since entry into the EU, olive 




























1987 1988 1989 1992 1993 1994
Figure 3: Import and Export of Oranges
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Table 8: Olive Oil Production 
 
 
  1985-6  1986-7  1989  1994 
C. Valenciana  13,313  15,310  13,289  10,120 
Spain  397,184  493,498  550,768  538,827 
 




Regarding EU subsidies to olive growers, in the summer of 1997, the 
Commission proposed a new mechanism to determine the amount of aid to be 
distributed to growers. Rather than give aid according to production, it was 
proposed to appropriate aid according to the number of t rees. This is 
problematic for olive growers, since they keep trees that do not yield fruit for 
environmental reasons, i.e. avoid erosion and provide nutrients in the soil. The 
Spanish government immediately sprang to action when the Commission created 
this ‘tree counting’ proposal. The Spanish agricultural minister invited other 
members of the Council of Ministers from northern European countries that are 
less familiar with olive oil. The ministers were brought to a scenic portion of 
Andalucia, the largest olive oil producing region in Spain, to taste different types 
of olive oil.  
 
  Quick action on the part of the Spanish Agricultural Minister demonstrates 
that the Spanish government was more willing to act on behalf of this 
Mediterranean product. The minister’s reaction was unlike her less than 
immediate reaction concerning milk penalties. Government officials are 
concerned about the fishing and milk sectors, but they know that these are 
agricultural sectors with strong European competition. This places Spain in a 
weaker bargaining position in Brussels concerning continental agricultural 
products. Mediterranean products, on the other hand, are easier for Spain to 
protect in Brussels and the Spanish Agricultural Ministry will put a great deal of 
effort into supporting Mediterranean agricultural products because they are more 
likely to be effective and successful (Agricultural Ministry, interview, 1997). 
 
  In this way, Valencia has experienced very positive effects from Spain’s 
EU membership. Their export economy has been enhanced and EU agricultural 
regulations have not affected the region. Thus, Valencia has maintained their 
competency over agriculture without restrictions and constraints from ‘above’. 
This enables Valencia not only the ability to legislate and implement agricultural  
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policies as they deem appropriate, but it also gives them more policy making 
freedom regarding regional development policy. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Improved regional government policy-making ability continues to be a trend 
throughout Europe and the EU does affect the extent to which this trend has 
taken place. The cases of Galicia and Valencia suggest that the ability of regions 
to legislate and implement their own economic development policies depend on: 
the economic conditions of the regions, the extent to which EU regulatory policy 
affects those conditions, and the ability of the region to influence the national EU 
agenda. In the case of Galicia, a peripheral region, the Spanish government has 
used less political resources to represent Galician concerns within the EU. 
Moreover, the Galician agriculturally based economy  
overlaps agricultural production in other European countries, i.e. France, Great 
Britain and Germany. For this reason, Galicia has received more EU imposed 
restrictions; finding its policy-making abilities constrained. 
 
On the other hand, Valencia’s Mediterranean agriculture has very little 
agricultural competition from other member states. For this reason, there is no 
need for severe CAP restrictions upon their agricultural sectors, i.e. citrus and 
olive oil. EU membership has meant a flourishing of Valencia’s historically export 
oriented economy. As a result, the region has augmented its economy and 
therefore has the resources to be better able to implement regional development 
policy. In addition, according to the principles of competitive advantage, the 
Spanish government has demonstrated a greater willingness to protect 
Mediterranean agricultural products at the European level. 
 
EU sectorally oriented regulations have had a territorial effect. This is of 
particular concern since EU regional development policy was created to diminish 
regional economic disparities within countries and throughout Europe to ensure a 
successful single market. EU policy initiatives in the form of regulations, 
however, have defeated the purpose of EU regional development policy and have 
actually maintained regional disparities. Since these regulations only affect certain 
regions, the ability for ACs to implement and legislate their own regional 
development and agricultural polices, (which are their competencies established 
in their statutes and the constitution) varies across Spain.  
 
With globalization and continued European integration it has become 
increasingly important for regions to take an active role in regional economic 
development. In light of changes in the international economy it has become 
increasingly important for lesser-developed regions to have a strong state role in 
order to implement effective policies that will promote development. Therefore,  
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we cannot discuss uniform change in regional governments’ ability to legislate, 
implement or regulate economic development policy nor can we expect the 
optimistic picture of a reallocation of competencies to sub-national levels of 
government the multi-level governance model suggests. Rather, we must take into 
account the specific national, supranational and sub-national context and the 
particular impact the EU has upon each region.  
   
The implication of these findings is that EU regulatory policy has a 
territorial impact and when it constrains the ability of regional governments to 
legislate, implement and regulate regional economic development policy it can 
exacerbate the underdevelopment of the region. Thus, EU regulatory policy can 
defeat the purpose of EU regional development policy and exacerbate regional 
economic disparities throughout Europe. The differential effects of EU regulatory 
policy due to accession agreements is also of considerable concern with the 
imminent accession of East and Central European countries. Thus, this study 
suggests that there is a need to examine the territorial implication of EU regulatory 
policy upon regional governments’ policy-making ability and the need to examine 
better the terms of accession to foresee what i mplications EU membership will 
have upon the regions of new member states. 
 
 
Carolyn Marie Dudek 
Jean Monnet Fellow, European Forum 
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LA VOZ DE GALICIA 
 
----“España todavia no ha solicitado que la UE posponga el pago de la 
supertasa.” December 5, 1996, p.69. 
----“Las industrias cifran en más de 2,500 millones la <<supertasa>> láctea a 
Galicia.” December 6, 1996, p.62. 
----“Los Productores gallegos dispondrán de casi tres años para pagar la 
<<supertasa>>.” December 4, 1996, p.65 
----“La Supertasa láctea equivale a la producción de 14,000 vacas” November 
19, 1996, p.65. 
----“Bruselas acusa a España de seguir subvencionando la construcción naval.” 
December 11, 1996, p.64. 
----“Armadores de Vigo critican la ineficacia de los programas plurianuales de la 
UE.” December 19, 1996, p.37. 
-----“Más de 17,000 desempleados de la Marina Mercante son Gallegos.” 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Of course, information and insight alone cannot ensure the creation of the most appropriate 
policies. Clientelism or the unwillingness of political actors can thwart the creation and 
implementation of effective policies. Thus, the proximity of regional governments is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to achieving effective regional development policies (Keating, 1998; Smyrl 
and Piattoni, 1998). 
2 See Philip Cooke and Kevin Morgan  The Associational Economy, Firms, Regions and 
Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 for more in innovation. 
3 Sharpe does suggest that favoritism of more advanced agricultural production has lessened with the 
1992 reforms of CAP. 
4 In the case of Spain, entry into the European Community was particularly difficult since under 
Franco a self-contained economic system was created that focused on domestic trade of products 
and a low level of imports. The EU forced Spanish industries to become more competitive since now 
they had to compete with the exterior. This meant that Spain had to undertake severe economic 
changes. 
5 In Spain, with the creation of the 1978 constitution there were three levels of autonomy created for 
the ACs. Some ACs have more responsibilities in policy making than others. At present, however, 
both Galicia and Valencia have the “high” level of autonomy. 
6 Objective 1 regions are those regions that have a GNP less than 75% of the European average. 
7 Agricultural competency is established as an exclusive competency of the AC in the Valencian 
Statute Title III, Art. 34:4, and in the Galician Statute Title II, Art.30:3.  Similarly, the AC’s have 
exclusive competency in the “planning of economic activity of the Community” (Valencian Stature, 
Title III, Art. 34:1,1 and Galicia Statute, Title II, Art. 30:1,1). On the other hand, fishing is a shared 
competency of the AC and the central government. According to both the Galician and Valencian 
Statutes the ordination of the fishing sector is a shared competency of the AC and the national 
government. According to the Statutes, concerning the fishing sector, AC’s develop legislation and 
execute legislation that emanate from the state (Valencian Statute, Title III, Art. 32:1,7 and Galician 
Statute, Title II, Art. 28:5).  
8 “Whereas, pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No 856/84 of 31 March 1984 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 on the common organization of the market in milk and products, 
an additional levy scheme was introduced from 2 April 1984 in the said sector; whereas the 
purpose of this scheme, introduced for nine years and due to expire in of 31 March 1993, was 
to reduce the imbalance between supply and demand for the milk and milk products market 
and the resulting structural surpluses; whereas it should therefore continue to be applied for 
seven further consecutive 12 month periods starting on 1 April 1993…Whereas if any total 
guaranteed quantities is overrun, the consequence for the Member States is that the producers 
who contributed to the overrun must pay the levy…(http://www.cc.cec/SG2/nph-sga_rqs).” 
9 The Act of Adhesion established a registration of 300 boats, a system of “list periods” which meant 
that only half of the fleet could fish at any one given time and a prohibition of fishing in certain zones. 
The Act of Adhesion also established a transitory period of sixteen years (1986-2003). Article 162 
of the Act established that “before the 31 of December, 1992 the Commission will present to the 
Council a report concerning the situation and the perspectives of fishing within the 
Community…according to the report, before the 31 of December 1993 adaptations that result as 
necessary will be put into effect” (quoted in Carderera, 1995). With the negotiation of the entrance 
of Finland and Sweden it was decided that these three countries would have to have the conditions  
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upon its fishing sector similar to those put upon the Iberian countries. During the negotiations of the 
three new members, Spain was able to obtain a promise from the Council to permit Spain to be 
integrated into the common fishing policy. Spain and Portugal pressured the EC to have more access 
to community waters. This means the future establishment of a single system of water access and 
resources to all countries. 
10 Although the EU does provide structural funds in the form of FIFG, this has not been considered 
adequate compensation for EU imposed regulations on boat construction and fishing. Of the total 
amount of structural funds, 1.9% are allocated for the fishing sector (La Voz de Galicia, October 
30, 1997). The structural funds program for 2002-2006, is approximated to reduce this amount by 
13% (La Voz de Galicia, October 30, 1997). For the 1994-1999 period Spain received 2,980 
million ecus for the fishing sector in the form of FIFG. Yet, some complain that this is insufficient for 
the Spanish fleet. Whether this is true or not, it is clear that the increased unemployment in this sector 
due to EU regulations upon this sector put ACs, like Galicia, in a vulnerable position. Galicia, 
traditionally an economically disadvantaged region, must now deal with increased unemployment in 
the fishing sector, yet at the same time is restricted to what they can do to remedy their situation.  
 